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Measuring the Primary Impacts of
Severance Taxation: A Spatial
Equilibrium Approach
Jill L. Findeis, James S. Shortle, Virginia M. Kibler
A spatial equilibrium model is used to quantify the effects of a severance tax on the
Pennsylvania coal market. Two regions are identified: the Pennsylvania Market Area and an
imporf/exportregion. The impacts on prices and quantities of coaf supplied and demanded are
found to be small. Little of the tax is exported from Pennsylvania, with a high proportion of
the tax being passed back to Pennsylvania coal producers. Although the tax revenue exceeds
the welfare losses in Pennsylvania, this result is very sensitive to the magnitude of the
Pennsylvania own-price demand elasticity.
Introduction
Numerous states have adopted coal severance taxes
as a means to generate state revenues (Stinson and
Temple). A coal severance tax appears to be par-
ticularly attractive to states exporting significant
quantities of coal. Montana and Wyoming are ex-
amples of such states in which coal severance taxes
are an important revenue source. Pennsylvania is
also a major coal producing state but does not cur-
rently have a coal severance tax. The taxation of
coal mined in Pennyslvartia would clearly add tax
revenue, but could have negative impacts as well.
This paper investigates the primary economic
impacts, both positive and negative, of a severance
tax on Pennsylvania steam coal. 1The issues of tax
exportation and tax incidence discussed by Morgan
and Mutti, Church and Gillis are addressed em-
pirically. From Pennsylvania’s perspective, the ef-
ficacy of a coal severance tax depends in part on
the tax revenues generated relative to the negative
effects on Pennsylvania producers and consumers.
The negative impacts on producers occur only in
Pennsylvania. A severance tax will reduce profits
of Pennsylvania coal producers and presumably lead
to job losses and reduced wages for coal miners as
well. In contrast, consumers throughout the North-
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‘ Steam coal, used primarily to generate electricity, constitutes the
majority of the coal mined in Pennsylvania.
east will be affected since a high proportion of
Pennyslvania coal is used to generate electricity in
other northeastern states. In general, the degree to
which a severance tax will negatively affect Penn-
sylvania depends on the proportion of the tax that
can be exported to out-of-state consumers. The ex-
tent to which a severance tax can be exported to
other states and the incidence of the tax on pro-
ducers and consumers within the taxing state are
important concerns.
Using an approach similar to that in Campbell
et al., Libbin and Boehlje, and Labys and Yang,
a spatial equilibrium model is designed to portray
the market for Pennsylvania steam coal including
its relation to surrounding coal producing states.
Using the model, the impacts of a severance tax
on coal prices, consumption, production, tax rev-
enue, and consumer and producer surplus are meas-
ured for Pennsylvania and for those states either
importing Pennsylvania coal or exporting coal to
the Northeast. These impacts are measured for al-
ternative tax rates and for various supply and de-
mand conditions in the trading regions. The
sensitivity of the study results to changing supply
and demand conditions for steam coal is examined.
Perspective
Pennsylvania currently produces an average 45 mil-
lion tons of steam coal annually. Of this, 68% is
used within Pennsylvania with the remainder ex-
ported out of state. A majority of the steam coal
mined in Pennsylvania is distributed within the
Pennsylvania Steam Coal Market (PSCM), a region
defined by Melmed using Hogarty’s LIFO/LOFI16 April 1988
test to include the states of Pennsylvania, New
York, Massachusetts, Delaware, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Maryland. In addition, Pennsyl-
vania exports some steam coal to Ohio, West Vir-
ginia, and Kentucky. Ohio, West Virginia, and
Kentucky supply most of the outside coal to PSCM
(U.S. Department of Energy).
Pemsyhnia has historically competed with West
Virginia and Ohio in the northeastern steam coal
market. A locational advantage has helped Penn-
sylvania to protect its market share. However, as
electricitydemand in the Northeast has grown, more
coal is being purchased from these other states. A
severance tax on Pennsylvania steam coal would
increase coal imports from other states and de-
crease coal exports from Pennsylvania, as the rel-
ative prices of Pennsylvania coal and coal from
other states change.
Empirical Analysis
Given this perspective, eight demand regions and
three supply regions are identified. The eight de-
mand regions include Pennsylvania, New York,
Massachusetts, Delaware, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Maryland, and the rest of the world, or
ROW. The supply sources include Pennsylvania
underground coal, Pennsylvania surface coal, and
all other suppliers of cordto the Pemsylvania Steam
Coal Market. The standard spatialequilibrium model
developed by Samuelson and operationalized by
Takayama and Judge is used, and competitive equi-
libria under alternative tax rates are computed using
quadratic programming. Specific severance tax rates
of $0.10, $0.20, $0.40, and $0.80 per ton are con-
sidered. These rates are well within the range of
severance tax rates in other eastern states (Stinson
and Temple) and the rates proposed in Pemsylvania.
Steam coal demand is specified for each state in
PSCM, and the demand for coal from Pennsylvania
by ROW is an export (from PSCM) demand func-
tion. Pennsylvania coal production is described by
steam coal supply functions for both surface and
underground production. The small quantity of coal
produced in Maryland and the coal suppliedto PSCM
from ROW is represented by an import (to PSCM)
supply function. The costs of coal shipments be-
tween states within the regions are assumed to be
linear in the quantities shipped.
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inverse demand function intercept, i = 1,
2>. ... 8;
inverse demand function slope, i = 1, 2,
. . . . 8;
inverse supply function intercept, j = 1,
2, 3;
inverse supply function slope, j = 1, 2,
3; and
marginal cost of transporting coal from
source j to i.
The objective function (1) is the net social payoff
function and measures the total producer and con-
sumer surplus from coal production and consump-
tion (Takayama and Judge). The first seven con-
straints defined by (2) restrict coal consumption in
each state in PSCM to no more than the amount
of coal shipped to those states, The eighth con-
straint defined by (2) restricts the amount of Penn-
sylvania coal consumed in ROW to no more than
the amount of coal shipped from Pennsylvania to
ROW. The first two constraints defined by (3) re-
Mrict coal shipments from Pennsylvania mines to
no more than the amount of coal produced by sur-
face and underground mines in the state. The third
constraint defined by (3) restricts coal consumption
within PSCM of ROW imports to no more than
the amount of coal shipped from ROW to states
within PSCM. Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3),
and the nonnegativity constraints given by (4) yields
quantities consistent with a competitive spatial
equilibrium. Equilibrium supply and demand prices
can be obtained respectively as the shadow pricesFbuieis,Shorde, and Kibler
for (2) and (3) in an optimal solution (Takayama
and Judge).
Parameters
The demand, supply, and transportation cost pa-
rameters are defined such that the pre-severance
tax equilibrium corresponds to a set of benchmark
prices and quantities under varying specifications
of the supply and demand elasticities. Specifically,
the intercepts and slopes of the demand and supply
functions are:
~~(~,–l),i=l z
(5) ai = ,, ..., 8;
li









~d= benchmark demand price of delivered coal 1
instate i,i=l,2, ...,7;
P:= benchmark supply price of coal exported
from PSCM to ROW;
li= own-price elasticity of demand, i = 1, 2,
. . . . 8;
~= benchmark supply price of coal from source
j,j=l,2,3; and
‘flj = elasticity of supply, j = 1, 2, 3.
The benchmark prices and quantities are aver-
ages of prices and quantities for 1981–83, with
prices in cents per million Btu and quantities meas-
ured in Btu. Data for computing benchmark prices
and quantities were obtained from the Cost and
Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility Plants, (1981-
83 Annuals), published by the U.S. Department of
Energy.
The benchmark demand price for each statewithin
PSCM is the consumption-weighted average of the
delivered cost of steam coal to utilities in the state
during the period from 1981–83. Because supply
and demand points have not been delineated within
Pennsylvania, it is assumed for simplicity that fnine-
mouth prices are delivered prices in the state in
competitive equilibrium. Thus, the benchmark sup-
ply price of coal produced in Pennsylvania is the
benchmark demand price. Similarly, since specific
origins and destinations within ROW have not been
delineated, the export demand price is defined as
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the supply price paid in Pennsylvania prior to trans-
port, while the import supply price is the price of
coal shipped from ROW to PSCM when delivered
in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the benchmark ex-
port demand and import supply prices are the
benchmark supply and demand prices in Pennsyl-
vania. The cost per ton of shipping coal from Penn-
sylvania to another state in PSCM is defined as the
average difference between the delivered price in
the state and the delivered price in Pennsylvania.
This definition assumes that delivered price differ-
entials reflect transportation cost differentials within
PSCM.
Because of the instability and structural changes
in the coal market during the past two decades,
reliable supply and demand elasticities cannot be
estimated (Bohi). Rather than using estimated elas-
ticities to define each of the supply and demand
parameters used in the programming model, a range
of plausible elasticities are used. The conventional
economic wisdom is that steam coal demand and
supply are inelastic, while excess supply and de-
mand are, in general, elastic.
Simulations
Differences in the supply and demand conditions
within PSCM and ROW are represented by alter-
native assumptions about demand and supply elas-
ticities. Ten alternative scenarios are examined
including a “base case” scenario defined by a set
of plausible intermediate values of the relevant
elasticities. For the base case, the own-price elas-
ticities of demand in Pennsylvania and in the other
states in PSCM are very inelastic. The uncondi-
tional demand elasticities used in the base case
are derived from 1981–83 average coal production
and electricity data, in conjunction with the de-
mand relationships estimated by Findeis and Shor-
tleand the own-price elasticitiesof electricitydemand
estimated by Beierlein, Dunn, and McConnen. For





Pennsylvania own-price demand elasticity:
–0.01
PSCM own-price demand elasticity (exclud-
ing Pennsylvania): – 0.29
Pennsylvania surface and underground sup-
ply elasticities: 0.4
2 The unconditional own-price demand elasticity for coal incorporates
the feedback effects of changing coal prices through the electricity mar-
ket. A changein the coal price affects the quantity of electricity de-
manded, which in turn affects the quantity of coal utilized (See Fhdeis
and Shortle).18 April 1988 NJARE
4. Export demand elasticity: – 2.0
5. Import supply elasticity: 2.0
For the other scenarios, the elasticities are varied
from the base case in order to examine the eco-
nomic implications of alternative elasticities and
the sensitivity of the base case results. The Penn-
sylvania supply elasticity ranged from 0.2 to 1.0,
the export demand elasticity from – 1.0 to – 4.0,
and the import supply elasticity from 1.0 to 4.0.
In addition, a Pennsylvania own-price demand
elasticity of – 0.03 is examined.
For each scenario, coal consumption in PSCM,
Pennsylvania production, Pennsylvania exports to
ROW, PSCM imports from ROW, and prices are
uniquely determined by the model solution. How-
ever, the distribution of Pennsylvania coal output
and ROW imports within PSCM is not uniquely
determined, since ROW imports to PSCM are as-
sumed to enter Pennsylvania at a price equal to the
price in Pennsylvania. Since the distribution of
Pennsylvania coal between Pennsylvania and the
other states in PSCM affects the extent to which a
tax can be exported from Pennsylvania, the allo-
cation of post-tax Pennsylvania supply and ROW
imports within PSCM is important. Different al-
locations may lead to differences in the total amount
of tax that is paid by consumers outside Pennsyl-
vania.
To address this problem, results are examined
under two allocation rules that provide reasonable
approximations to the actual distribution of Penn-
sylvania coal and ROW imports within PSCM.
Specifically, Pennsylvania suppliers are assumed
to maintain either (a) their current market share of
Pennsylvania consumption, or (b) their current
market share of PSCM consumption, excluding
Pennsylvania. The impacts of each allocation are
analyzed for the base case. Although the actual
allocation may differ from these alternative as-
sumptions, allocations (a) and (b) reflect the range
of reasonable possibilities.
Base Case Scenario Impacts
The impacts of imposing a severance tax on the
market structure represented by the base case are
surprisingly small (Table 1). At the maximum tax
rate ($0.80 per ton), the price of coal in Pennsyl-
vania increases by only 0.579i0.As a result, Penn-
sylvania consumption is negligibly affected,
decreasing by less than 0.01%. Since a tax imposed
on Pennsylvania coal will increase the relative price
of coal supplied by Pennsylvania, the amount of
coal exported from Pennsylvania decreases and the
quantity of coal imported to PSCM from states
other than Pennsylvania increases. In the base case,
the quantity of coal supplied by.Pennsylvania de-
creases by approximately 0.6090, while imports to
PSCM and exports to ROW change by slightly
more than 1Yoat the highest tax rate.
The tax revenues paid by producers and con-
sumers in Pennsylvania, by consumers in the other
states in PSCM, and by the import/export region
are shown in Table 2. In the base case, Pennsyl-
vania consumers and producers pay over 90% of
a severance tax imposed on Pennsylvania steam
coal regardless of the tax rate. Most of the re-
maining 10% of the tax is paid by consumers in
the other six states in PSCM, with consumers in
the impotiexport region paying less than 1% of
the tax. As indicated in Table 2, the results are
invariant to changes in the assumed allocation of
coal within PSCM. Under each allocation the result
is the same: very little of the tax can be exported
from Pennsylvania.
The welfare burden of the tax is also concen-
trated in Pennsylvania (Table 3). An examination
of the changes in producer and consumer surplus
attributable to taxation indicates that a large pro-
portion of the tax burden is borne by producers in
Pennsylvania in the form of producer surplus losses.
Producer surplus losses in Pennsylvania comprise
approximately75!Z0 of thetax-inducedwelfarelosses,
Table 1. Percent Change in Pennsylvania Price, Pennsylvania Consumption, Pennsylvania
Supply, Imports to PSCM, and Exports to ROW in Base Case
Price in Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Imports Exports
Tax Rate Pennsylvania Consumption supply to PSCMa to ROW
($/ton) ---------------------------------------------------------- (% change)-----------------------------------------------------------
0.10 0.0777 –0.0010 –0.0742 0.1460 –0.1381
0.20 0.1294 –0.0010 –0.1486 0.2943 -0.2879
0.40 0.3106 –0.0031 –0.2995 0.5885 –0.5890
0.80 0.5695 –0.0364 –0.5961 1.1765 – 1.1762
‘Including Pennsylvania.Findeis, Shorde, and Kibler Measuring the Primary Impacts of Severance Taxation 19
Table 2. Tax Revenue Generated: Base Case
Regional Revenue Source”’
From From Percent of
Tax Total Tax From PSCM Import/Export Tax Exported From







































‘Regional revenue burdens for any tax rate for consumers are computed by multiplying the increase in the equilibrium price by
the amount purchased from Pennsylvania suppliers at the tax rate. The revenue burden of Pennsylvania suppliers is the difference
between the total revenue burden and the total revenue burden of consumers.
Table 3. Changes in Consumer and Producer Surplus in Base Case
Change in Consumer Surplus
Tax Rate
($/ton)
Region 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.80
-------------------------------------------------(thous. $) -------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania – 944 – 1,889 –4,721 – 8,498
PSCM (exe. PA) – 572 – 1,092 –2,345 –4,725
ROW”’ – 87 – 173 – 432 – 773
TOTAL – 1,603 –3,154 – 7,498 – 13,996
Change in Producer Surplus
Tax Rate
($/ton)
Region 0,10 0.20 0.40 0.80
-------------------------------------------------(thous. $) -------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania –3,414 – 6,826 – 12,539 –26,142
PSCM (exe. PA) o 0 0 0
ROWa’ 446 893 2,240 4,055
TOTAL –2,968 –5,933 – 10,299 – 22,087
Total Charree in Economic Surolus
Tax Rate
($/ton)
Region 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.80
-------------------------------------------------(thous. $) -------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania –4,358 –8,715 – 17,260 – 34,640
PSCM (exe. PA) – 572 – 1,092 –2,345 –4,725
ROW 359 720 1,808 3,282
TOTAL –4,571 – 9,087 – !7,797 – 36.083
“’Changesrepresent net surplus changes in ROW.20 April 1988
despite the inelastic coal demand. Welfare losses
are particularly high among producers because the
tax-induced increase in price results in increased
imports from ROW to PSCM. Elastic imports from
ROW prevent the tax from being passed forward
to consumers to any significant extent and result
in producer surplus gains in ROW. Consumer sur-
plus losses are greatest in Pennsylvania. The other
states in PSCM lose approximately one-half the
consumer surplus lost in Pennsylvania, and the sur-
plus losses in the import/export (ROW) region are
small,
A comparison of the total welfare losses induced
by a tax to total tax revenue indicates that the bur-
den of a severance tax on Pennsylvania steam coal
exceeds the tax revenue generated. However, from
Pennsylvania’s perspective, a comparison of the
tax revenue gains to the welfare losses in Penn-
sylvania is warranted (Table 4). Although only part
of the welfare effects are in Pennsylvania, all of
the tax revenue accrues to Pennsylvania. A com-
parison of the instate revenue gains to the instate
welfare losses indicates that in the base case the
tax revenues exceed the welfare losses by a small
amount, Pennsylvania is a net gainer but the net
gains from taxation are minimal.
Sensitivity of Results
The results are contingent on the values of the
elasticities defining the base case. Given structural
changes in the coal industry (Bohi), the sensitivity
of the base case results to alternative elasticity as-
sumptions is examined. In particular, the sensitiv-
ity of the study results to changes in the import
supply, export demand, Pennsylvania supply and
Pennsylvania own-price demand elasticities is es-
timated.
Variation of the Import Supply and Export
Demand Elasticities
Variations of the import supply elasticity between
1.0 and 4.0 and the export demand elasticity be-
tween – 1.0 and – 4.0 had little impact on esti-
PIJARE
mated coal prices, consumption levels, and the
quantity of steam coal supplied by Pennsylvania.
These variables change by less than 1% over the
ranges of import supply and export demand elas-
ticities examined, with the results slightly more sen-
sitive to variations in the import supply elasticity.
Variations of the import supply and export de-
mandelasticitieshave a greater impacton the amount
of tax exported and the distribution of the economic
burden of the tax between producers and consum-
ers. Pennsylvania’s ability to export a tax on coal
is diminished when the import supply is more elas-
tic relative to the base case. For the import supply
elasticity values examined here, Pennsylvania can
export between 3.9 and 12,770 of the $0.80 tax.
The higher percentages for each tax rate are as-
sociated with a more inelastic import supply.
Differences in the ability to export a tax are
principally due to differences in the distribution of
the tax revenue burden between producers and con-
sumers. This distribution is affected significantly
by the responsiveness of coal imports to tax-induced
increases in the price of Pennsylvania coal. For the
most elastic import supply elasticityconsideredhexe,
4.0, Pennsylvania producers pay $31,5 million of
the tax, consumers in Pennsylvania pay $2.9 mil-
lion, and consumers outside Pennsylvania pay $1.4
million. In total, consumers pay only 1490of the
$0.80 tax, with 3.9% paid by outside consumers.
This compares to $21.7 million by producers, $9.7
million by Pennsylvania consumers, and $4.6 mil-
lion by consumers outside Pennsylvania when the
import supply elasticity is 1.0. In this case con-
sumers pay 4070 of the tax, and 12.7% of the tax
isexported. Pennsylvaniacoal producerspay a higher
proportion of the tax when the import supply is
more elastic, since the more elastic supply holds
prices down.
Although the distribution of the economic bur-
den varies significantly with changes in the import
supply elasticity, the tax-induced welfare losses in
Pennsylvania largely offset each other, causing the
high and low estimates of the total welfare losses
to vary by at most $1.4 million. A comparison of
the total welfare losses in Pennsylvania to the total
revenue raised by the tax indicates that tax revenue
Table 4. Tax Revenue and Tax Burden in Pennsylvania in Base Case
Tax Rate Tax Burden Total Tax











– 34.64 35.95Findeis, Short[e, and Kibler
generally exceeds consumer plus producer surplus
losses in the state, but only by a small amount.
This is true for each of the elasticity assumptions.
Changes in the export demand elasticity have
even smaller impacts on the study results. For the
alternative export demand elasticities, the tax rev-
enue paid by producers and consumers of steam
coal in Pennyslvania varies by at most $1.1 million
and $0.7 million, respectively. In total, the pro-
portion of the tax that Pennsylvania can success-
fully export generally varies by less than 1% over
the range of export demand elasticities. This com-
pares to a range of nearly 9% for the import supply
elasticities.
Similarly, variation of the export demand elas-
ticity has little impact on the total economic burden
of the tax. At the highest tax rate considered, the
total economic burden in Pennsylvania ranges be-
tween $34.4 and $34.6 million. At lower tax rates
the differential is even smaller. The export demand
elasticity has little impact principally because little
coal is exported to ROW.
Variations of the Pennsylvania Elasticities
The Pennsylvania own-price demand and supply
elasticities are also varied to test the sensitivity of
the base case results. Prices and consumption levels
are more sensitive to the Pennsylvania supply elas-
ticities than to import supply and export demand
elasticities, but the effects remain small. Never-
theless, the impact on the distributions of tax rev-
enueburden andeconomicburden betweenproduexxs
and consumers is again substantial. For example,
at the $0.80 tax rate, the tax revenue paid by Penn-
sylvania producers ranges from $18.3 and $30.5
million, by Pennsylvania consumers between $3.7
and $12.0 million, and by consumers outside Penn-
sylvania between $1.8 and $5.5 million. When
Pennsylvania supply is more elastic than the base
case, Pennsylvania is able to export more of the
tax. Pennsylvaniacan export between 4.9 and 15.4%
of the $0.80 tax, with 15.470 corresponding to the
most elastic case considered.
Changes in consumer and producer surplus also
vary significantly in response to changes in the
Pennsylvania supply elasticity. With the $0.80 tax,
surplus losses in Pennsylvania range from $18.4
to $30.6 million for producers and from $4.7 to
$15.1 million for consumers. In comparison to the
base case, consumer surplus losses increase and
producer surplus losses decrease when Pennsyl-
vania supply is more elastic. Regardless of the sup-
ply elasticity, the gains in tax revenue outweigh
the tax-induced welfare losses in the state, although
onlv bv a small amount.
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When the own-price elasticity of demand is var-
ied to – 0.03, the effects on the delivered price of
coal and on coal consumption in Pennsylvania are
negligible and the changes in total tax revenue are
minimal as a result. However, losses in producer
surplus increase significantly over the base case
when the demand elasticity is varied. In the base
case, producer surplus losses in Pennsylvania equal
$26.1 million with the $0.80 tax. This compares
to producer surplus losses of $33.2 million when
the own-price elasticity equals – 0.03 and illus-
trates the principal impact of a change in the Penn-
sylvania own-price demand elasticity, i.e., when
the demand for coal in Pennsylvania iseven slightly
more elastic, more producer surplus is lost. These
losses are not offset by comparably smaller losses
in consumer surplus.
Changes in the Pennsylvania demand elasticity
therefore have important implications for tax adop-
tion. At an own-price demand elasticity of – 0.03,
total consumer plus producer surplus losses in
Pennsylvania exceed the tax revenues at each tax
rate because of large losses in producer surplus.
This results in a negative net welfare position for
Pennsylvania.
Implications
The changes in delivered prices and consumption
induced by a severance tax in Pennsylvania are
small. Pennsylvania’s price, consumption, and
production vary less than 1% indicating that a sev-
erance tax will have minimal effects on Pennsyl-
vania coal production levels and consumer prices.
However, the ability of Pennsylvania to export a
severance tax on coal is limited. Pennsylvania pro-
ducers and consumers pay a majority of the tax
under all scenarios. This is a reflection both of the
high proportion of Pennsylvania coal consumed in
the state and the inability of producers to pass tax-
inducedprice increases on to consumers. The results
show that states with substantial mineral reserves
should not assume that a severance tax can provide
tax revenues without significant negative effects.
The assumption that Pennsylvania can export a sig-
nificant proportion of a severance tax is invalid.
The impacts of a severance tax on Pennsylvania
coal producers were substantial. Coal producers
will bear most of the burden of the tax. Given the
difficulties of the coal industry and the economic
problems of coal mining areas, the wisdom of im-
posing a tax with these impacts is questionable.
This is especially true, given the sensitivity of the
results to changes in the own-price elasticity of
demand in Pennsylvania. The base case value was22 April 1988 NJARE
very inelastic. For more elastic values the producer
surplus losses are even greater. In addition, with
more elastic demand the in-state welfare losses ex-
ceed the tax revenues. Under the circumstances,
coal severance taxation does not look attractive for
Pennsylvania.
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